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Loan payments made within a year of a
bankruptcy filing could be considered
avoidable preferences if the loan were
guaranteed by a corporate insider. In this
article, Prof Boshkoff argues that bankers
should value insider guaranties only as a
second source of payment, not for any subtle
pressure they may exert on the borrower.
The Risks of Insider
Guaranties
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF
A BANK LOANS money on an unsecured basis
to Ajax Corporation. The loan is guaranteed by Samuel Surety, Ajax's
president. Ajax repays the loan. Six months later, the corporation files
for protection under Chapter 11. Is the bank subject to a preference
challenge?
After the beginning of the bankruptcy case, the bank receives a
demand for return of the repayment. Ajax's trustee asserts that the
payment amounted to an avoidable preference. Such transactions are
normally vulnerable only if bankruptcy occurs within 90 days, but if
an insider is involved the transaction remains at risk for a full year.
The trustee seeks to take advantage of this longer period of vulnerabil-
ity. The bank, vaguely aware of the insider preference rules, demurs.
It understands that the longer time period applies only to payments
received by an insider, and it clearly does not fall within this category.
The trustee's response is troubling. She argues that the bank has re-
ceived an avoidable transfer since the repayment indirectly benefited
an insider, Ajax's president. If her contention is correct, the bank may
regret its decision to obtain a guaranty from a corporate official. To
understand why this is so, we must review some basic principles of
preference law.
Prof. Boshkoff is professor of law at Indiana University, Bloomington. He was assisted
by Thomas C. Smith, Class of 1988.
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An Avoidable Preference Defined
A preference has six elements, found in Section 547(b) of the Bankrupt-
cy Code.1 It is a transfer (1) of the debtor's property, (2) on account
of an antecedent debt, (3) made while the debtor is insolvent, and
(4) that enables the creditor to obtain more money than would have
been obtained by waiting for the bankruptcy distribution. The trustee
should have little difficulty in establishing these first four elements.2
The remaining two elements deserve closer attention. It is worthwhile
to quote the exact statutory language: The challenged transfer (5) must
be "to or for the benefit of a creditor" and (6) must occur "(a) on or within
90 days before the date of filing of the petition; or (b) between 90 days
and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor
at the time of such transfer was an insider ...."
Now we can understand the trustee's argument. Our hypothetical
transaction fits neatly within the statutory language. Both the bank
and Surety are creditors of Ajax, the bank as the initial lender and
Surety as a guarantor who is entitled to reimbursement if called upon
to honor his guaranty.3 The repayment by Ajax directly benefits the
bank and indirectly benefits Surety since it satisfies his potential re-
imbursement claim. Since Surety is an insider of Ajax at the time of
the repayment, the one-year period of vulnerability-not the shorter
90 days-is applicable to this transaction.
A second section of the bankruptcy statute confirms the soundness
of the trustee's position. Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code outlines
the remedial rights of the trustee, once all the elements of an avoid-
able preference have been established. The trustee is entitled to re-
cover avoidable prebankruptcy payments from "the initial transferee
of such transfer [the bank] or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made [Surety]," although the trustee "is entitled to only a single
satisfaction."4
Thus, these sections of the Bankruptcy Code combine to give the
trustee two rights it would not have had in the absence of an insider
guaranty:
The period of preference vulnerability is extended from 90 days
to one year.
'11 U.S.C. §547 (b) (1983).2Only that third element (insolvency) presents a substantial evidentiary hurdle.
The trustee will have to show that six months before bankruptcy, Ajax's liabilities
exceeded its assets. This is the definition of insolvency found in 11 U.S.C. §101 (29)
(1983). The presumption of insolvency created by 11 U.S.C. §547 (f) (1983) applies
only to transactions occurring within 90 days of bankruptcy.8A creditor is an entity with a "right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent [or] unmatured..." 11
U.S.C. §101(4), (9) (1983).
411 U.S.C. §550 (a) (c) (1983).
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* The trustee enjoys the option of proceeding against either Surety
or the bank. This option will be significant, and detrimental to
the bank, if Surety's financial condition always was weak or has
deteriorated to the point where his guaranty is now worthless.
Should this occur, the bank will regret its decision to require a
guaranty of an insider because it is now the obvious target for
the trustee's avoidance action.
Equitable Versus Literal Interpretations of Law
Bankruptcy is not a happy occasion. There are many losers and few,
if any, winners. Bankruptcy judges face hard choices and may be
tempted to eschew a literal application of the statute if it will produce
what seems to be an inequitable result. Preference law often appears
quite arbitrary. Not surprisingly, judges have been torn between two
conflicting theories of statutory interpretation. They have vacillated
between strict adherence to statutory language and a looser, more eq-
uitable interpretation. Collier, the leading commentator on bankruptcy
law, has advocated the latter approach to our fact situation:
In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a)
would permit the trustee to recover from a party who is
innocent of wrongdoing and deserves protection. . . . [I]f
a transfer is made to a creditor who is not an insider more
than 90 days but within one year before bankruptcy and
the effect is to prefer an insider-guarantor, recovery should
be restricted to the guarantor and the creditor should be
protected. Otherwise, a creditor who does not demand a
guarantor can be better off than one who does.5
Is Collier's analysis sound? I think not. It misstates the consequence
of permitting a recovery against the bank and, more important, demon-
strates a fundamental misunderstanding of the special insider prefer-
ence rules that are a part of the bankruptcy statute enacted in 1978.
When financial distress occurs, persons in control of debtors often
seek to advance their own interests. Occasionally, litigation illumi-
nates this dark side of business life. My favorite example is Katz
v. First National Bank of Glen Head ,6 a case that arose under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The bank in Katz had made an unsecured
loan of $125,000 to Oakland. This loan was guaranteed by Oakland's
president. The debtor maintained an account at the lender bank, but
the balance and activity in this account was negligible until late April
1971. Before that time Oakland's regular banking business was con-
ducted elsewhere. Between April 20 and June 30, 1971, there were
several deposits, but no withdrawals, which brought the balance in
the account from a meager $865.09 to $108,783.91. No explanation
54 Collier on Bankruptcy 550.02 (15 ed.1987).
6568 F.2d 964 (2d Cir.1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
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was offered for the dramatic change in banking practice. The lender
then set off this sum against the outstanding guaranteed loan. Since
Oakland was in serious financial difficulty (it had virtually ceased do-
ing business in March 1971), the account build-up was very suspicious.
It takes little imagination to conclude that Oakland's president, anx-
ious about the guaranty, hoped to arrange for payment of the loan
by providing the lender with the opportunity for setoff. A direct re-
payment by the debtor would have been both obvious and avoidable.
Indirect payment by deposit and setoff looked like a more subtle and
less clearly vulnerable procedure. The court in Katz, however, had no
difficulty in fashioning a theory to vitiate the setoff, even without any
proof of the bank's complicity in the build-up. 7
Congress had such insider influence very much in mind when it
enacted the new preference statute almost 10 years ago. For the first
time, in Section 547, it provided a separate and more rigorous rule for
transactions directly or indirectly advantageous to persons in a posi-
tion to control the debtor's activity before bankruptcy. The extended
period of vulnerability makes it almost impossible to escape the pref-
erence sanctions by stalling the bankruptcy case until the period of
vulnerability has passed. One year is a very long time for a busi-
ness in distress. Furthermore, the insider preference rules apply to all
transactions involving insiders, not just insiders shown to have acted
improperly.8 Since there is no need to prove actual misconduct, this
preference rule resembles the six-month insider-profit recapture rule
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,9 a highly pragmatic rule that
recognizes the practical difficulty an outsider faces in proving insider
misbehavior. Permitting recovery from the bank furthers the objective
of the insider-preference rule-to deny persons of influence any oppor-
tunity of using assets of a financially distressed debtor in ways that
benefit themselves and disadvantage unsecured creditors.
Collier may be correct in characterizing that bank as "a party who is
innocent of wrongdoing," but this is beside the point. Since the insider
rule operates without proof of actual misconduct by either Surety or
the bank, Collier's argument against literal application of the statute
loses its appeal.
Furthermore, the clear error in the last sentence of the quotation
becomes apparent. A bank with an insider-guaranteed loan improves
its chances for repayment. It must pay a price for this advantage.
Insider guaranties carry increased risks. The bank's absolute liability
7The court, as a condition to validating the setoff required a showing that the
deposits were made in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. A similar rule is
now found in the Bankruptcy Code. See the discussion below.
8The definition of insider is found in 11 U.S.C. §101(28) (1983). It lists persons
such as corporate presidents who are presumed to control the debtor and also persons
who actually do control the debtor. There is no requirement of proof that the insider
acted with regard to the challenged transaction.
9Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §16(b), 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1983).
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is completely consistent with the new rule policing the activity of those
who have the power to influence the debtor's conduct.
Was the Transfer in the Ordinary Course of Business?
Preference law is designed to prevent an unequal (and presumably un-
fair) distribution of the debtor's free assets among unsecured creditors
on the eve of bankruptcy. There are occasions, however, when a lit-
eral application of the statutory language appears to produce results
at variance with this policy. Collier's reluctance to follow the language
of the statute is nothing new. There are many well-known examples
of judicial refusal to apply preference rules because of a perception
that the result is not consistent with preference policy. Courts often
have disregarded the statutory language in favor of what is seen as an
equitable solution.
Such an approach creates problems. It results in conflicting and
confusing precedents and hastens the day that a statutory overhaul
will be necessary. Congress was well aware of judges' attitudes when
it enacted the current bankruptcy statute, and it attempted to deal
with equitable issues in a more systematic fashion. 10 The statute now
contains an entirely new subsection that prevents the avoidance of
transfers containing all the statutory elements of a preference (the six
elements discussed above) if the transferee (the bank in our example)
sustains the burden11 of proving that the transaction fits within one
of seven carefully crafted exceptions. The exception relevant to this
discussion is contained in 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(2):
The trustee may not avoid ... a transfer ... to the extent
that such transfer was-
(A) In payment of a debt incurred by a debtor in the ordi-
nary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
transferee;
(B) Made in the ordinary course of business or financial af-
fairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) Made according to ordinary business terms.
Note the significant elements in this protective provision. The bank
must establish the normality of the repayment both subjectively and
objectively. The transfer must be regular from the perspective of the
parties to the loan transaction and from the perspective of the larger
commercial community. It will be very hard, but not impossible, for
10The inability of both courts and Congress to adopt a consistent approach to prefer-
ence law is meticulously examined in Weisberg, Commercial Morality, The Merchant
Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1986).
1111 U.S.C. §547(g) (1983) provides: "For the purposes of this section, the trustee
has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subdivision (b) of this
section, and the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is
sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer under subdivision
(c) of this section."
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the bank to sustain this burden. Certainly, it will not be sufficient to
claim that there was no proof of improper motive on the part of the
bank or Surety. 12 Since it will already have been demonstrated that
Ajax Corporation was insolvent when the loan was repaid six months
ago, the court will want a very full explanation of how and why it was
decided that the bank should be repaid at a time when there was not
enough money available to satisfy all creditors. Collier's plea for an
equitable reading of Sections 547(b) and 550 of the statute ignores the
fact that Congress has provided very effective protection for the bank
but only if it can pass the test outlined in Section 547(c)(2). Instead
of ignoring the substantive definition of a preference, one must accept
that definition and then go to subdivision c to see whether the trustee
will be prevented from avoiding the transaction.13
So Far, Court Cases Favor Lenders
The analysis above reflects my personal view. To what extent is it
shared by judges and commentators? Most commentators agree with
me. 14 Judges, with one exception, have reached results favorable to
the lender and have limited the trustee to action against the insider-
guarantor. 5 The notable exception is In Re Big Three Transp., Inc.,16
an adversary proceeding brought by a trustee to recover payments on
an unsecured loan guaranteed by a corporate insider. The challenged
payments had been made more than 90 days before the involuntary
case began. The court, nevertheless, ordered entry of judgment against
both the insider-guarantor and the noninsider-creditor.
Judge Baker's opinion in Big Three stands in notable opposition to
five other reported decisions that have refused to permit recovery from
the noninsider-creditor when the preferential payment has occurred
more than 90 days before bankruptcy. All these opinions were written
12In re AOV Industries, Inc., 62 Bankr. 968 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1986).
131 have assumed in this discussion that Surety in our example was guaranteeing
a long-term loan and that Section 547(c)(2) protects repayments of both short- and
long-term obligations. It is not yet clear, however, that this provision is applicable
to single advance, long-term obligations. See, for example, In re Energy Corporation,
Inc., 832 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt
as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 Duke
L.J. 78.
14Markel, Payments on Insider-Guaranteed Debts; A Bankruptcy Preference?, 15
Colo. Lawyer 1390 (1986); Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting
Code Sections 547 (c) (2) 550 (a) (1), and 546 (a) (1), 41 Bus. Lawyer 175, 186-194
(1985); Pitts, Insider Guarantees and the Law of Preferences, 55 Am. Bankr. L.J. 343
(1981).
151n re C.L. Cartage Co., Inc., 70 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Aerco
Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.,
58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); Matter of R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 Bankr.
888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); In re Church Bldgs. and Interiors, Inc., 14 Bankr. 128
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
1641 Bankr. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983). See also In re W.E. Tucker Oil, Inc., 42
Bankr. 897, 901 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984) (citing Big Three with approval).
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by trial court judges. We have yet to hear from a court of appeals.
Those that refuse to hold the bank liable sometimes rely on the quo-
tation from Collier discussed above. 17 Not one of these opinions, not
even Big Three, discusses the policy issue of whether the bank should
be protected even though it is in a position to benefit from the exercise
of insider influence.
With the exception of Collier, all the commentators clearly see the
possibility for exercise of insider influence and argue that the lender
should be liable. As one author notes:
In many, if not most instances in which a creditor seeks
guaranties by insiders, the guarantor's assets are insignif-
icant in relation to the size of the credit advance or loan,
and the guaranties are sought, not for their economic value,
but for the indirect control of the debtor that they provide.
There is the unspoken understanding that the creditor will
ruin the guarantors if their activities in running the debtor
corporation are not to the creditor's liking. In the case of
unusual payments made to a creditor with an insider's guar-
anty, one is hard put to deny that the existence of the guar-
anty creates added incentive to make the transfer... [The]
indirect control of the debtor corporation certainly detracts
from a notion that [the lender's] plight merits special con-
sideration so that the written words of Congress should not,
in equity, be applied to them.18
Lenders undoubtedly would prefer to believe that Collier and the ma-
jority of judicial decisions will remain the prevailing view. This is a
risky course of action. Sooner or later, some appellate court is going
to take a close look at the insider guaranty transaction, read all the
commentators, and see the weakness in Collier's position. Once there
is one full discussion in a well-reasoned case imposing liability on the
lender, the prevailing majority view will crumble. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit, in dictum, recently expressed doubts about the equitable pro-
tection currently provided to lenders who benefit from the presence of
insider quarantors. 19 Perhaps the editors of Collier will soon decide to
align the treatise with the weight of scholarly opinion.
17Aerco Metals, 60 Bankr. at 81; Deprizio Constr., 58 Bankr. at 481; R.A. Beck
Builder, 34 Bankr. at 893; Church Bldgs., 14 Bankr. at 131.
18Nutovic, supra note 15, at 196.
19After describing a situation in which Lender has received payment outside the
90-day period from Firm when Guarantor is an insider, the Seventh Circuit offered
this observation: "Most bankruptcy courts that have addressed this question conclude
that 'equity' will relieve Lender from a literal construction of §550. Commentators,
whose articles collect and discuss the cases, are divided We have serious doubts both
about the amount of equity in Lender's position (for Firm may have paid Lender
preferentially only to assist Guarantor, the insider ) and about the propriety of judges
declining to enforce statutes that produce inequitable results ... "Bonded Financial
Services v. European-American Bank, 838 F.2nd 890 (1988).
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What Should Lenders Do?
Lenders worried about insider guaranties should consider placing great-
er reliance on fully collateralized loans and on loan guaranties provided
by persons who are not insiders. While this article has stressed the
risk that insider guarantors may expose the lender to an extended pe-
riod of preference vulnerability, the presence of an insider guarantor
could be detrimental even when the loan is repaid in the 90 days be-
fore bankruptcy. The lender is clearly a vulnerable transferee when
payments are received during this 90-day period. The only option may
be to seek protection under the ordinary course payment exception
found in Section 547(c)(2).The presence of an insider guarantor may
arouse the court's suspicion and make it much more difficult to ad-
vance a convincing argument that the payment was a normal business
transaction. 2
0
Lenders who want to continue demanding insider guaranties should
do so only when the guarantor has assets that are adequate to dis-
charge the guaranteed obligation. If this is the case, it is worthwhile
to have a guaranty because the lender forced to return payments to
the bankruptcy trustee may still proceed against the guarantor. If the
guarantor's assets are insufficient, however, a court is likely to infer
that the desire to benefit from insider influence and not the desire
for additional financial security was the lender's primary objective in
asking for the guaranty. Such a conclusion is not helpful to a lender
seeking to establish its good faith and benefit from Collier's position.
Assume that an insider guarantor had adequate assets at the time
the guaranty was obtained but is in poor financial condition when the
loan is due to be repaid. The lender should consider releasing the guar-
antor before receiving payment. The insider-preference rules apply
only when an insider is involved at the moment of payment.2 ' Further-
more, since the released insider no longer has an incentive to induce
debtor conduct favorable to the lender, it becomes easier to argue that
the payment meets the regularity requirements of Section 547(c)(2).
The lender should ensure that there is no linkage between release and
payment ("We will release you if the loan is repaid"). The best course of
action is to leave a substantial period of time between the two events,
so that the lack of linkage will be obvious to all observers. 22
It is most appropriate to release the insider when there is no sig-
nificant likelihood of any recovery on the guaranty. The decision is
more difficult when the insider has some assets, although not enough
to discharge the entire corporate obligation. Here, the lender must bal-
20The presence of an insider guarantor, although not dispositive, was noted in In re
Craig Oil Co., 31 Bankr. 402 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983).
2111 U.S.C. §547 (b) (4) (B) (1983).
22It is absolutely crucial that the guarantor not be an insider at the time the cor-
porate decision to repay the loan is made. See In re Trans Air, Inc., 79 Bankr. 947
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re F & S Central Manufacturing Corp., 53 Bankr. 842
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985).
26 Commercial Lending Review
ance the cost of release against the possibility of improving its strategic
position.
Any reluctance to release Surety simply because it will lessen the
possibility of extracting payment from Ajax supports the main point
of this article. Notwithstanding Collier's position, insider guaranties
are different from all other guaranties. They bring with them the
possibility of asserting influence over the debtor's affairs and producing
payments that would not otherwise be made. Sooner or later, more
judges will recognize this and act to neutralize the especially beneficial
effect of insider guaranties.
